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In recent years, the gap between theory and practice in quantum key distribution (QKD) has
been significantly narrowed, particularly for QKD systems with arbitrarily flawed optical receivers.
The status for QKD systems with imperfect light sources is however less satisfactory, in the sense
that the resulting secure key rates are often overly-dependent on the quality of state preparation.
This is especially the case when the channel loss is high. Very recently, to overcome this limitation,
Tamaki et al proposed a QKD protocol based on the so-called “rejected data analysis”, and showed
that its security—in the limit of infinitely long keys—is almost independent of any encoding flaw
in the qubit space, being this protocol compatible with the decoy state method. Here, as a step
towards practical QKD, we show that a similar conclusion is reached in the finite-key regime, even
when the intensity of the light source is unstable. More concretely, we derive security bounds for
a wide class of realistic light sources and show that the bounds are also efficient in the presence
of high channel loss. Our results strongly suggest the feasibility of long distance provably-secure
communication with imperfect light sources.
I. INTRODUCTION
The gist of quantum key distribution (QKD) [1–3] is that it allows two remote parties, Alice and Bob, to establish
common secret keys in the presence of an adversary, Eve, who may have unlimited computing resources and techno-
logical advances. Today, three decades after its introduction, QKD has made enormous progress in both theory and
practice, and is arguably on the verge of global commercialisation. Having said that, however, there are still some
issues, both theoretical and experimental, that need to be resolved before we can reach that level. Amongst those,
the most pressing one is the mismatch between device models used in security proofs and actual devices used in
QKD systems. In particular, such implementation loopholes can lead to side-channel attacks that break the security
of QKD. Notably, it has been repeatedly demonstrated that the behaviour of single-photon detectors employed in
QKD systems can be externally controlled, simply by exploiting their physics [4]. In this case, it is easy to verify
that security cannot be achieved, since the measured data are not representative of the quantum channel [5]. Un-
doubtedly, such hacking demonstrations raise not only the importance of proper calibration of QKD systems, but
also the importance in developing security proof techniques that can tackle modeling discrepancies. Indeed, in the
past few years, much attention has been devoted towards the development of such proof techniques and side-channel
countermeasures, particularly in the areas of security of finite-length keys [6–10] and detector side-channel attacks
[11–14].
Amongst these theoretical results, only a few considered the issue of state preparation flaws—despite that it is
a commonly faced experimental problem. More concretely, typical light sources used in QKD systems are not true
single-photon sources and practical optical modulators employed to encode the light pulses are inherently limited in
precision. The former can be resolved by using the decoy-state method [15–17], which allows QKD systems based on
practical light sources to achieve the security performance of single-photon QKD. The latter, however, does not have
an adequate solution. In particular, it has been firstly shown by Gottesman et al [18] that such inaccuracies in encoding
can lead to very pessimistic secret key rates in the presence of high quantum channel loss. Also, other works show
similar results [19]. This strong dependency on channel loss is primarily due to the fact that state preparation flaws
can be seen as a form of basis information leakage, which gives Eve some advantage in formulating basis-dependent
attacks. Crucially, as shown in [18, 19], Eve’s advantage can be significantly enhanced by exploiting channel losses.
Consequently, this heavily penalizes the secret key rate whenever the channel loss is substantial.
Very recently, a loss-tolerant QKD protocol [20] has been proposed by Tamaki et al as a means to overcome typical
encoding flaws in QKD systems. More specifically, as briefly mentioned earlier, here we are considering encoding
flaws due to imprecise alignment of optical modulators. For example, if the quantum states are encoded into the
polarisation degree-of-freedom of photons, an encoding flaw could be due to a misalignment in the wave-plate used
to set the desired polarisation. The protocol is similar to the Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) QKD scheme [21], but
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FIG. 1: In each trial, Alice’s laser emits two consecutive coherent pulses representing the signal and the reference pulse. For
this, she first uses an amplitude modulator to select the pulses’ intensity k ∈ K. After that, she applies a phase shift {0, π, π/2}
to the signal pulse. On reception, Bob splits the received pulses into two beams and then applies a phase shift {0,−π/2} to
one of them. Also, he applies a one-pulse delay to one of the arms of the interferometer and then recombine the pulses at a
50:50 beamsplitter (BS). A “click” in detector D0 (D1) provides Bob the key bit y′ = 0 (y′ = 1).
instead of considering all the four BB84 states, it uses only three of them. Interestingly, by considering statistics
beyond those of the BB84 protocol, the resulting secret key rate is the same as the one of BB84’s [22–26]. More
importantly, the secret key rate has the very nice property in that it is almost independent of encoding flaws. These
results imply that the usual stringent demand on precise state preparation can be considerably relaxed and one only
needs to know the prepared states. Additionally, it is useful to mention that most current BB84 QKD systems can
easily switch to the loss-tolerant QKD protocol without much hardware modifications.
In anticipation that the loss-tolerant QKD protocol will be widely implemented in the near future, we extend the
security analysis in Ref. [20] to the finite-key regime, i.e., we derive explicit bounds on the extractable secret key length
(in [27], the authors have implemented the loss-tolerant protocol experimentally with careful verification of the qubit
assumption used in the protocol. This paper also includes some finite-key analysis of the protocol. Unfortunately,
however, its phase error rate estimation seems to be valid only against collective attacks). Furthermore, our bounds
can be applied to a wide range of imperfect light sources—including typical cases whereby the intensity of the laser is
fluctuating between a certain range. Also, the security bounds are obtained within the so-called universal-composable
framework [28, 29], and thus secret keys generated using these bounds can be applied to other cryptographic tasks
like the one-time-pad. In order to investigate the feasibility of our results, we consider a QKD system model that
borrows parameters from recent fibre-based QKD experiments. With this realistic model, our numerical simulations
show that provably-secure keys can be distributed up to a fibre length of about 120 km, even when only 1011 signals
are sent by Alice to Bob.
This paper is organised as follows. In section II, we describe some assumptions that we made in our security analysis
and after that we introduce our protocol. In section III, we give the security definition of the protocol and provide
the formulation of the extractable secret key length. In section IV, we present the results of the parameter estimation
using the decoy-state method for two different cases: an exact intensity control case and an intensity-fluctuation case.
Then, in section V, we simulate the key generation rate for both scenarios. Finally, section VI concludes the paper
with a summary. The paper includes as well some Appendixes with additional calculations.
II. ASSUMPTIONS AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PROTOCOL
A. Assumptions on Alice and Bob’s devices
Prior to stating the actual protocol, we first describe the assumptions on the user’s devices.
We consider that Alice’s transmitter contains a laser source, an amplitude modulator and a phase modulator.
See Fig. 1. The laser is single-mode and emits signals with a Poissonian photon number distribution. Also, we
assume that Alice encodes the bit and the basis information in the relative phase θA between a signal and a reference
pulse, whose joint phase is perfectly randomised 1. Let us emphasise, however, that the security proof that we
provide in this paper applies as well to other coding schemes like, for instance, the polarisation or the time-bin coding
1 Note that the recent work shows that discrete phase randomisation is sufficient for in a BB84 protocol [30].
3schemes. Next we present the two types of imperfections that we consider for Alice’s device.
1. Intensity fluctuations.
The fluctuation of the intensity of the emitted coherent light is typically due to the laser source and imperfections in
the amplitude modulator. Here we shall consider that Alice does not have a full description of the probability density
function of the fluctuations, but she only knows their range 2. That is, she knows that the intensity k of the emitted
coherent light lies in an interval k ∈ [k−, k+] except with error probability ǫinten, where k+(−) is the upper (lower)
intensity. For simplicity, we shall assume that ǫinten = 0. If ǫinten > 0 this error probability can be directly taken
into account through the security parameter ǫsec whose definition is referred to equation (40). The intensities of the
signal and reference pulses are ksig := kV and kref := k(1− V ) respectively, with 0 < V < 1.
In section IV. A we study the case where k = k− = k+, i.e., there are no intensity fluctuations. After that, in
section IV. B, we evaluate the typical scenario where k+ > k−.
2. Imperfect encoding of the bit and basis information.
In our protocol, Alice chooses the relative phase θA at random from {0, π/2, π} to encode the bit and basis
information. The phase θA ∈ {0, π} corresponds to the Z basis states which are selected with equal probability, and
θA = π/2 denotes the X basis state. Alice assigns a bit value y = 0 to θA ∈ {0, π/2} and a bit value y = 1 to θA = π.
Due to the misalignment of the optical system, however, the actual relative phase prepared by Alice may deviate
from the desired angle θA by a factor ∆θA. Hence, we have that the actual state Alice sends to Bob can be typically
described as ∫ 2pi
0
p(∆θA)P
[
|
√
krefeiχ〉r|
√
ksigei(χ+θA+∆θA)〉s
]
d∆θA. (1)
Here, we define P [·] = |·〉〈·|, the parameter χ ∈ [0, 2π) is a random phase, the state |α〉s(r) is the coherent state of the
signal (reference) pulse, and p(∆θA) is the probability distribution of ∆θA.
Alice does not need to know the origin of the encoding errors ∆θA, but we assume that she knows p(∆θA). Also,
we assume that p(∆θA) is independently and identically distributed for each run of the protocol. Moreover, we
consider that there are no side-channels in Alice’s device.
Assumptions on Bob’s apparatus
We consider that the detection efficiency of Bob’s detectors is independent of his measurement basis choice. A phase
value θB = 0 (θB = −π/2) corresponds to a device parameter to choose the Z (X) basis for the measurement.
Also, like in the case of Alice, we consider that Bob uses an imperfect phase modulator that shifts the phase of the
incoming signals by θB + ∆θB, where ∆θB is the modulation error. Note, however, that this last assumption is not
needed in the security proof; we use it only for simulating the resulting secret rate. Furthermore, we assume that
there are no side-channels in Bob’s device.
B. Protocol description
We study a three-state protocol that uses one signal and two decoy settings. Also, we consider that the protocol
employs an asymmetric coding, i.e., the Z and the X basis are chosen with probabilities pz and px = 1 − pz,
respectively. The secret key is extracted only from those events where both Alice and Bob select the Z basis and the
signal setting. In addition, we assume that Alice and Bob do not implement a random sampling procedure to estimate
the bit error rate, but they perform error correction for a pre-established fixed value of it. The error verification step
of the protocol (see Step 5 below) informs them about whether or not the actual residual bit error rate exceeds the
considered value.
The protocol runs as follows.
Actual protocol
2 Note that in those scenarios where Alice knows the exact probability distribution of the fluctuations then the conventional decoy-state
method can be directly applied.
4First, Alice and Bob decide a security parameter ǫsec whose definition is referred to equation (40). Then,
they repeat the first three steps of the protocol for i = 1, ..., N until the conditions in the Sifting step are met.
1. Preparation
For each i, Alice randomly chooses the intensity k ∈ K = {ks, kd1, kd2} with probability pks , pkd1 and
pkd2 = 1− pks − pkd1 , respectively. The intervals [k−, k+] where the different intensities lie have to satisfy k−d1 > k+d2
and k−s > k
+
d1 + k
−
d2. Then, Alice randomly selects the basis a ∈ {Z,X} with probabilities pz and px, respectively.
Next, she chooses at random the signal phase θA ∈ {0, π} when she selects the Z basis, and she chooses θA = π
when she selects the X basis. Finally, she generates the signal and reference pulses following these specifications
and sends them to Bob via the quantum channel.
2. Measurement
Bob measures the incoming signal and reference pulses using the measurement basis b ∈ {Z,X}, which he randomly
selects with probabilities pz and px, respectively. The outcome is recorded in d ∈ {0, 1,⊥, ∅}, where ⊥ and ∅
represent the double click event and the no click event, respectively. If d =⊥, Bob assigns a random bit to it 3. As
a result, he obtains y′ = {0, 1, ∅}.
3. Sifting
Alice and Bob announce their bases and intensity choices over an authenticated public channel and identify the
following sets: Zk := {i|a = b = Z ∧ Intensity = k ∧ y′ 6= ∅}, Xjk := {i|a = b = X ∧ Intensity = k ∧ y′ = j},
Z0(1)Xjk := {i|a = Z∧b = X∧Intensity = k∧y = 0 (1)∧y′ = j} andXZjk := {i|a = X∧b = Z∧Intensity = k∧y′ = j}
with j ∈ {0, 1} and k ∈ K. Then, they check if the following conditions are met: |Zk| ≥ NZk ,
|Xjk| ≥ NXj
k
, |Z0(1)Xjk| ≥ NZ0(1)Xj
k
and |XZjk| ≥ NXZj
k
for all j ∈ {0, 1}, all k ∈ K, and for certain pre-
established values NZk , NXj
k
, NZ0(1)Xj
k
and NXZj
k
, where | ∗ | represents the length of the set ∗.
We denote by N the number of pairs of coherent states (i.e., signal and reference pulses) sent by Alice until these
conditions are fulfiled. We denote Alice and Bob’s sifted keys as (ZA, ZB); their size is |ZA| = |ZB| = |Zks |.
4. Parameter estimation
They estimate the number of events m0(1) where Alice emitted the vacuum (the single-photon) state within the set
Zks . Their expression is given by equations (12) and (18) for the scenario without intensity fluctuations, and by
equations (23) and (28) for the case with intensity fluctuations. Also, Alice and Bob estimate Nph, i.e., the number
of the so-called phase errors in the single-photon emissions within the set Zks (see equation (36)). They check if the
phase error rate eph := Nph/m1 is lower than a predetermined threshold value eph, which corresponds to the phase
error rate associated with a zero secret key rate (see equation (2)). If eph ≥ eph they abort the protocol; otherwise
they proceed to step 5.
5. Postprocessing
Alice and Bob perform error correction over an authenticated public channel for (ZA, ZB). This step consumes at
most λEC bits. Finally, they implement an error verification step and, after that, they perform privacy amplification
using a hash function that extracts a secret key pair (SA, SB), where |SA| = |SB| = ℓ bits.
III. SECURITY BOUNDS
The security of a QKD protocol is characterised by its correctness and secrecy. That is, following the universal
composable security framework [28, 29], the protocol is called ǫsec-secure if it is both ǫc-correct and ǫs-secret, where
ǫsec = ǫc + ǫs. Here, the correctness criterion is met whenever the output keys, SA and SB, are identical. More
generally, for some small error ǫc in the correctness, we say that the protocol is ǫc-correct if Pr[SA 6= SB] ≤ ǫc is met.
For the secrecy criterion, it is met whenever the joint classical-quantum state describing Alice’s output key and Eve’s
quantum system is of the following form, UA ⊗ ρE, where UA is the uniform distribution over all bit strings, and ρE
3 Note that this random assignment is not mandatory, and Bob can always choose a particular bit value, say 0, for d =⊥ as this preserves
the basis-independence detection efficiency condition.
5is an arbitrary quantum state held by Eve. Likewise, for some small error ǫs, we say the protocol is ǫs-secret if
1
2
‖ρSAE − UA ⊗ ρE‖1 ≤ ǫs,
where ρSAE is the joint state shared by Alice and Eve. Note that || · ||1 is the trace norm defined as || · ||1 = Tr
√
·†·.
Using these security definitions, it can be shown (see Appendix A for details) that a lower bound on the secret key
length for the protocol described above
ℓ ≥
⌊
mL0 +m
L
1 [1− h(eUph)]− log2
2
ǫ2s − η
− λEC − log2
2
ǫc
⌋
, (2)
where h(x) = −x log2 x − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the binary entropy function, mL0(1) is a lower bound on m0(1),
eUph := N
U
ph/m
L
1 is an upper bound on the phase error rate, and η is the sum of the failure probabilities when
estimating m0 and eph. This last parameter is upper bounded by η ≤ 1−EZ,0EZ,1Eph, where EZ,0, EZ,1 and Eph are
the failure probabilities associated to the estimation of mL0 , m
L
1 and to the upper bound on the number of the phase
errors NUph, respectively.
IV. PARAMETER ESTIMATION
In this section, we briefly describe the estimation procedure to obtain mL0 and m
L
1 . Also, we provide an expression
for NUph. The detailed calculations are included in Appendix D.
As mentioned in section II. B, we assume that the phase of each pulse generated by the laser is perfectly randomised.
This means, in particular, that we can regard the signals sent by Alice as a classical mixture of Fock states, each
of them representing the total number of photons contained both in the signal and in the reference pulse. That is,
the probability that Alice emits a pulse with n photons conditioned on the fact that she selects the intensity setting
k ∈ K is written as
p(n|k) = e−k k
n
n!
. (3)
Also, from the property of the decoy state method we have that the total number of detection events when both Alice
and Bob use the Z basis is given by
|Ztot| :=
∑
k∈K
|Zk| =
∞∑
n=0
SZ,n, (4)
where SZ,n represents the number of detection events when Alice and Bob used the Z basis and Alice emitted an
n-photon state.
A. Estimation of the number of vacuum and single-photon contributions for the exact intensity control case
We consider first the scenario without intensity fluctuations in the source, i.e., when k = k− = k+.
Owing to the use of decoy-states [15–17], it can be shown that Eve cannot obtain any useful information about
Alice’s intensity choice if she observes an n-photon state in the quantum channel. Therefore, it can be demonstrated
that the actual protocol, where Alice chooses the intensity of each signal before she actually sends it to Bob, is
equivalent to a counterfactual protocol described as follows. First, Alice prepares and sends n-photon states to Bob.
Then, Bob measures all the signals received from Alice. Afterwards, Alice decides the intensity setting for each signal.
Due to this equivalence between the actual and the counterfactual protocols, we have that the number of detection
events |Zk| for setting k ∈ K within |Ztot| has the form
|Zk| = 〈Zk〉+ δk, (5)
except with certain error probability that will be introduced later on, and where 〈Zk〉 denotes the mean value of |Zk|
given by
〈Zk〉 =
∞∑
n=0
p(k|n)SZ,n. (6)
6The parameter δk that appears in equation (5) denotes the deviation between the experimentally obtained quantity
|Zk| and its expected value. The convergence of δk is discussed in Appendix B.
a. Estimation of the number of vacuum contributions
At first, we calculate a lower bound on m0, the number of events in Zks that originate from a vacuum state sent by
Alice. We define the mean value of m0 as µ0 = p(ks|0)SZ,0. Now, by applying Lemma 1 from Appendix B we obtain
that
m0 ≥ µ0 −∆Z,0, (7)
except with certain error probability ǫZ,0, where the deviation ∆Z,0 is given by ∆Z,0 = gC(µ0, ǫZ,0) with gC(x, y) =√
2x ln 1/y. So far, the lower bound on m0 depends on the unknown mean value µ0 which cannot be directly observed
in the experiment. According to the definition of µ0, however, this problem can be solved by estimating a lower bound
on SZ,0. For this, we use a result from [8]. In particular, we have that
SZ,0 ≥ p(0)
kd1 − kd2
(kd1ekd2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉 −
kd2e
kd1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉
)
=: SLZ,0, (8)
where p(0) =
∑
k∈K pk p(0|k). To estimate the mean values 〈Zkd1〉 and 〈Zkd2〉, we can employ either Lemma 2 or
Lemma 3 introduced in Appendix B, such that the fluctuation is minimised. In so doing, we obtain a lower bound on
〈Zkd2〉 together with an upper bound on 〈Zkd1〉 given by
〈Z−kd2〉 := |Zkd2 | −min
{
gM
(
|Zkd2|, (ǫkd2Z,0 )3/2
)
, gH(|Ztot|, ǫkd2Z,0 )
}
, (9)
〈Z+kd1〉 := |Zkd1 |+min
{
gM
(
|Zkd1|, (ǫkd1Z,0 )4/16
)
, gH(|Ztot|, ǫkd1Z,0 )
}
, (10)
where gM(x, y) =
√
2x ln 1/y and gH(x, y) =
√
x/2 ln 1/y. The failure probability associated with the estimation of
〈Zk〉, with k ∈ {kd1, kd2}, is either given by εkZ,0 = ǫkZ,0 or by εkZ,0 = ǫkZ,0 + ǫkH,Z,0, depending on which Lemma (2 or
3) we use. As a result we find that
µ0 ≥ p(ks|0)SLZ,0 ≥
pkse
−ks
kd1 − kd2
(kd1ekd2
pkd2
〈Z−kd2〉 −
kd2e
kd1
pkd1
〈Z+kd1〉
)
=: µL0 , (11)
which only depends on known parameters. Note that in equation (11) we have used the fact that p(ks|0) =
pksp(0|ks)/p(0) = pkse−ks/p(0) in combination with equation (8). We finally obtain, therefore, that
m0 ≥ µL0 −∆Z,0 =: mL0 , (12)
except with error probability εZ,0 = ǫZ,0 + ε
kd1
Z,0 + ε
kd2
Z,0.
b. Estimation of the number of single-photon contributions
Here, we calculate a lower bound on the number of single-photon pulses sent by Alice that contribute to Zks . For
this, we use a similar technique to the one described in the previous section. In particular, let µ1 be the mean value
of m1, which is given by µ1 = p(ks|1)SZ,1. Then we have that
m1 ≥ µ1 −∆Z,1, (13)
except with error probability ǫZ,1, where ∆Z,1 = gC(µ1, ǫZ,1). From Ref. [8], we have that
SZ,1 ≥ p(1)ks
(kd1 − kd2)(ks − kd1 − kd2)
[ekd1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉 −
ekd2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉+
k2d1 − k2d2
k2s
(SLZ,0
p(0)
− e
ks〈Zks〉
pks
)]
=: SLZ,1, (14)
7where p(1) =
∑
k∈K pk p(1|k). As before, by using Lemmas 2 and 3 from Appendix B we obtain a lower bound on
〈Zkd1〉, and an upper bound on 〈Zkd2〉 and 〈Zks〉. They are given by
〈Z−kd1〉 := |Zkd1 | −min
{
gM
(
|Zkd1|, (ǫkd1Z,1 )3/2
)
, gH(|Ztot|, ǫkd1Z,1 )
}
, (15)
〈Z+k〉 := |Zk|+min
{
gM
(
|Zk|, (ǫkZ,1)4/16
)
, gH(|Ztot|, ǫkZ,1)
}
, (16)
where the second equality holds for k ∈ {ks, kd2}. The failure probability associated with the estimation of 〈Zk〉 (with
k ∈ K) is either given by εkZ,1 = ǫkZ,1 or by εkZ,1 = ǫkZ,1 + ǫkH,Z,1, depending again on which Lemma (2 or 3) we apply.
By employing the relation p(ks|1) = pksp(1|ks)/p(1) = pkskse−ks/p(1), we obtain a lower bound on µ1, which only
depends on known parameters,
µ1 ≥ p(ks|1)SLZ,1
≥ pksk
2
s e
−ks
(kd1 − kd2)(ks − kd1 − kd2)
[ ekd1
pkd1
〈Z−kd1〉 −
ekd2
pkd2
〈Z+kd2〉+
k2d1 − k2d2
k2s
( µL0
p(ks ∧ 0) −
eks〈Z+ks〉
pks
)]
=: µL1 . (17)
Therefore, we have that
m1 ≥ µL1 −∆Z,1 =: mL1 , (18)
except with error probability εZ,1 =
∑1
n=0(ε
kd1
Z,n + ε
kd2
Z,n) + ǫZ,1 + ε
ks
Z,1, where the parameters ε
kd1
Z,0 and ε
kd2
Z,0 come from
the estimation of µL0 .
B. Estimation of the number of vacuum and single-photon contributions for the intensity-fluctuation case
We now evaluate the scenario where the laser suffers from intensity fluctuations. As introduced above, here we
shall assume that Alice only knows the range [k−, k+] where the intensity value k lies. Below we introduce the final
expressions for the different parameters; the detailed derivations are referred to Appendix C.
a. Estimation of the number of vacuum contributions
Here, we present the result for the estimation of the lower bound on TZ,0. Here, TZ,0 is the sum of the conditional
probability that Bob detects a signal in the Z basis conditioned that Alice chooses the signal intensity and sends a
vacuum state in the Z basis (see equation (61)). It is given by
TZ,0 ≥ 1
k−d1 − k+d2
(k−d1ek−d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉 −
k+d2e
k+d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉
)
=: T LZ,0. (19)
To calculate the mean values 〈Zkd1〉 and 〈Zkd2〉 we employ Azuma’s inequality, which is described in Lemma 4 (see
Appendix B). Importantly, note that this inequality holds without assuming independence of the trials. As a result,
we obtain a lower bound on 〈Zkd1〉 together with an upper bound on 〈Zkd2〉. They are given by
〈Z−kd2〉 := |Zkd2 | − gA(Nz, ǫkd2Z,0 ), (20)
〈Z+kd1〉 := |Zkd1 |+ gA(Nz, ǫkd1Z,0 ), (21)
where gA(x, y) =
√
2x ln(1/y), and Nz is the number of events where Alice and Bob use the Z basis within N trials.
In so doing, we find a lower bound on µ0 that only depends on parameters that are directly observed in the
experiment. It has the form
µ0 ≥ p−(ks ∧ 0)T LZ,0
≥ pkse
−k+s
k−d1 − k+d2
(k−d1ek−d2
pkd2
〈Z−kd2〉 −
k+d2e
k+d1
pkd1
〈Z+kd1〉
)
=: µL0 , (22)
8where the p−(ks ∧ 0) is a lower bound on p(ks ∧ 0).
Finally, we obtain a lower bound on m0 which is given by
m0 ≥ µL0 −∆Z,0 =: mL0 , (23)
except with error probability εZ,0 = ǫZ,0 + ǫ
kd1
Z,0 + ǫ
kd2
Z,0.
b. Estimation of the number of single-photon contributions
Here, we introduce a lower bound on TZ,1. Here, TZ,1 is the sum of the conditional probability that Bob detects
a signal in the Z basis conditioned that Alice chooses the signal intensity and sends a single-photon state in the Z
basis (see equation (70)).
It is given by
TZ,1 ≥ k
−
s
(k+d1 − k−d2)(k−s − k+d1 − k−d2)
[ ek−d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉 −
ek
+
d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉 −
(k+d1)
2 − (k−d2)2
(k−s )2
(ek+s
pks
〈Zks〉 − T LZ,0
)]
=: T LZ,1. (24)
Again, to estimate the mean values 〈Zkd1〉, 〈Zkd2〉 and 〈Zks〉 we employ Lemma 4. This way we obtain a lower bound
on 〈Zkd1〉 and an upper bound on 〈Zkd2〉 and 〈Zks〉 as
〈Z−kd1〉 := |Zkd1 | − gA(Nz, ǫkd1Z,1 ), (25)
〈Z+k〉 := |Zk|+ gA(Nz, ǫkZ,1), (26)
where the second equality holds for k ∈ {ks, kd2}.
Hence, a lower bound on µ1 can be directly written as
µ1 ≥ p−(ks ∧ 1)T LZ,1
≥ pkse
−k−s (k−s )
2
(k+d1 − k−d2)(k−s − k+d1 − k−d2)
[ek−d1
pkd1
〈Z−kd1〉 −
ek
+
d2
pkd2
〈Z+kd2〉 −
(k+d1)
2 − (k−d2)2
(k−s )2
(ek+s
pks
〈Z+ks〉 −
µL0
p−(ks ∧ 0)
)]
=: µL1 , (27)
where p−(ks ∧ 1) is a lower bound on p(ks ∧ 1).
Finally, we obtain mL1 as
m1 ≥ µL1 −∆Z,1 =: mL1 , (28)
except with error probability εZ,1 =
∑1
n=0(ǫ
kd1
Z,n + ǫ
kd2
Z,n) + ǫZ,1 + ǫ
ks
Z,1.
C. Estimation of the number of phase errors
In this section we present an upper bound onNph, which is the number of phase errors in the single-photon emissions
within the set Zks . As already mentioned in section II. B, the states sent by Alice are given by equation (1), and we
assume that the distribution p(∆θA) is known to Alice.
We denote the single-photon part of equation (1) as ρ(θA); it is given by
ρ(θA) =
∫ 2pi
0
p(∆θA)
1
2
[
σI +
2γ
1 + γ2
(
cos(θA +∆θA)σZ + sin(θA +∆θA)σX
)
+
1− γ2
1 + γ2
σY
]
d∆θA, (29)
where the parameter γ =
√
ksig/kref . Here we define the eigenvectors of the Pauli operators σY , σZ and σX as:
|0y〉 = |1〉r|0〉s, |1y〉 = |0〉r|1〉s, |0z〉 = (|0y〉 + |1y〉)/
√
2, |1z〉 = (−i|0y〉 + i|1y〉)/
√
2 and |ix〉 = (|0z〉 + (−1)i|1z〉)/
√
2
with i ∈ {0, 1}. The state |n〉r(s) denotes an n-photon number state of the reference (signal) pulse.
With this notation, the single-photon part of the three states sent by Alice can be expressed as ρ0z = ρ(0), ρ1z = ρ(π)
and ρ0x = ρ(π/2). Let ρS = (σI + ~σ · ~VS)/2, where ~σ = [σX , σY , σZ ] and the Bloch vector ~VS = [V SX , VY , V SZ ] is a real
9three-dimensional vector that satisfies |~VS | ≤ 1 with S ∈ {0z, 1z, 0x}. From [20] we have that if VY 6= 0, the phase
error rate of ρ0z and ρ1z is equivalent to that obtained after the application of the following filter operation,
FY = (1 +
√
1− VY /
√
1 + VY )P [|0y〉] + 2VY /(−1 + VY +
√
1− V 2Y )P [|1y〉]. (30)
This means, in particular, that we can restrict ourselves to the estimation of the phase error rate of the states ρ˜S
which lie in the σX -σZ plane,
ρ˜S :=
FY ρSF
†
Y
Tr[F †Y FY ρS ]
=
(σI + r
S
xσX + r
S
z σZ)
2
, (31)
where the parameters rSx and r
S
z are given by r
S
x = V
S
X f(VY ) and r
S
z = V
S
Z f(VY ) with f(VY ) = 1/
√
1− V 2Y . The
states ρ˜S given by equation (31) can also be decomposed as
ρ˜S = P
S
0 P [|φS0 〉] + PS1 P [|φS1 〉], (32)
where the probabilities PSi have the form
PSi =
1
2
(
1− (−1)i
√
(rSx )
2 + (rSz )
2
)
, (33)
and the eigenvectors |φSi 〉 are given by
|φSi 〉 =


1
N
(
rSz−(−1)
i
√
(rSx )
2+(rSz )
2
rSx
|0z〉+ |1z〉
)
(rx 6= 0)
|iz〉 (rx = 0 ∧ rz < 0)
|i⊕ 1z〉 (rx = 0 ∧ rz > 0)
(34)
=: aSi |0z〉+ bSi |1z〉, (35)
for i ∈ {0, 1}, and where N is the normalisation factor of the state.
After some lengthy calculations (see Appendix D for details), we obtain that Nph is upper bounded by
Nph ≤
1∑
s=0
P (s+ 1)
2{1 + (−1)s(√P 0z0 P 1z0 〈φ0z0 |φ1z0 〉+√P 0z1 P 1z1 〈φ0z1 |φ1z1 〉)}
[
NMXs(3) +NMXs(4)
+ (−1)s
1∑
t=0
√
P 0zt P
1z
t
{
Ct,0NMXs(3) + Ct,1NMXs(4) + Ct,2NMXs(5)
}]
+∆s⊕1A,s+1
=: NUph, (36)
except with error probability εph. Here, the terms NMXs(j) with j ∈ {3, 4, 5} are defined in equations (97)-(99); the
quantities P (1) and P (2) are given by equation (82); the parameters Ct,l have the form Ct,l := (a
0z
t a
1z
t +b
0z
t b
1z
t )A
−1
0,l +
(a0zt b
1z
t + b
0z
t a
1z
t )A
−1
1,l +(a
0z
t a
1z
t − b0zt b1zt )A−12,l for l ∈ {0, 1, 2}; the coefficients A−1i,j are the (i, j) element of the following
matrix
A−1 :=
1
Q

2(r1zx r0xz − r0xx r1zz ) 2(r0xx r0zz − r0zx r0xz ) 2(r0zx r1zz − r1zx r0zz )2(r1zz − r0xz ) 2(r0xz − r0zz ) 2(r0zz − r1zz )
2(r0xx − r1zx ) 2(r0zx − r0xx ) 2(r0zx − r0xx )

 , (37)
where Q := r1zx (r
0x
z − r0zz )+ r0xx (r0zz − r1zz )+ r0zx (r1zz − r0xz ); and the fluctuation term ∆s⊕1A,s+1 is given by equation (96).
V. SIMULATION OF THE KEY RATE
In this section, we show the simulation result for a fibre-based QKD system. Alice chooses the intensity of the laser
from the set {ks, kd1, kd2}, where we fix the intensity of the weakest decoy state to kd2 = 2×10−4. This is so because, in
practice, it is difficult to generate a vacuum state due to the imperfect extinction of the amplitude modulator. Also,
we assume that Bob uses an active measurement setup with two single-photon detectors with detection efficiency
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FIG. 2: (Colour online) Secret key rate (per pulse) in logarithmic scale vs fibre length for the case with exact intensity control.
The security parameter is ǫsec = 10
−10 and the total number of signals sent by Alice is N = 10s with s = 9, 10, 11 and 12 (from
left to right). The rightmost two lines correspond to the asymptotic secret key rate with two decoy settings. The solid lines
denote the case ξ=0 (i.e., the perfect encoding scenario) while the dashed lines show the case ξ=0.147 which is equivalent to
a phase modulation error of 8.42◦ (this error parameter is measured in an updated version of a commercial plug&play system
(ID Quantique Clavis2) [27]). The experimental parameters are described in the main text.
FIG. 3: (Colour online) Postprocessing block size |Zks | vs fibre length for a fixed total number of signals N = 10
s sent by Alice
with exact intensity control, with s = 9, 10, 11 and 12 (from left to right). The solid lines correspond to the case ξ=0 and the
dashed lines are for ξ=0.147.
ηdet = 15% and a dark count probability pd = 5 × 10−7. The attenuation coefficient of the optical fibre is 0.2dB/km
and its transmittance is ηch = 10
−0.2D/10 with D denoting the fibre length. The overall misalignment error of the
optical system is fixed to be emis = 1%. In addition, we assume an error correction leakage λEC = fEC|Zks |h(ez),
where ez is the bit error rate of the sifted key (ZA, ZB). Moreover, for simplicity, we consider that the error correction
efficiency of the protocol is a constant number fEC=1.16 which does not depend on the size of Zks . For simplicity, we
model the imperfection of Alice’s (Bob’s) phase modulator as ∆θA = ξθA/π (∆θB = −∆θA). Also, we consider that
the intensity fluctuation of the laser source lies in the interval [k−, k+] with k− = (1 − r)k and k+ = (1 + r)k for a
fixed value r.
In these conditions, we simulate the secret key generation rate R = ℓ/N for a fixed value of the correctness coefficient
ǫc = 10
−15. For this, we perform a numerical optimisation of the resulting secure key rate over the free parameters
pz, pks , pkd1 , ks and kd1.
A. Key generation rate for the exact intensity control case
The resulting secret key rate for this scenario, i.e. when r = 0, is shown in Fig. 2. The security parameter is
ǫsec = 10
−10 and the total number of signals sent by Alice is N = 10s with s = 9, 10, 11 and 12. We consider two
possible cases: ξ = 0 (i.e., the perfect encoding case) and ξ = 0.147, which is equivalent to a phase modulation error
of 8.42◦. For comparison, Fig. 2 also includes the asymptotic secret key rate (i.e., the key rate in the limit of infinitely
large keys) with two decoy settings.
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FIG. 4: (Colour online) Secret key rate (per pulse) in logarithmic scale vs fibre length when the intensity fluctuation is 2%.
The security parameter is ǫsec = 10
−10 and the total number of signals sent by Alice is N = 10s with s = {14, 15} (from left
to right). The rightmost two lines correspond to the asymptotic secret key rate with two decoy settings. The solid lines denote
the case ξ = 0 (i.e., the perfect encoding scenario) while the dashed lines show the case ξ = 0.147 (which is equivalent to a
phase modulation error of 8.42◦). The experimental parameters are described in the main text.
FIG. 5: (Colour online) Postprocessing block size |Zks | vs fibre length for a fixed total number of signals N = 10
s sent by
Alice, with s = {14, 15} when the intensity fluctuation is 2% (from left to right). The solid lines correspond to the case ξ=0
and the dashed lines are for ξ=0.147.
As a result, we find that the effect of state preparation flaws on the key generation rate is almost negligible. Also,
we have that if the total number of signals sent by Alice is about N = 1012, Alice and Bob can exchange secret keys
over 150 km both when ξ = 0 and ξ = 0, 147.
Finally, Fig. 3 shows the postprocessing block size |Zks | which is the length of the bit string to be processed in error
correction and privacy amplification as a function of the distance when N = 10s with s = 9, 10, 11 and 12.
B. Key generation rate for the intensity-fluctuation case
In this section we evaluate the resulting secret key rate when the laser source suffers from intensity fluctuations.
We study two cases: r = 0.02 and r = 0.05, where r is the deviation rate from the expected value of the intensity.
The results are shown in Figs. 4 and 6. Here we consider that N = {1014, 1015}, and the term ξ takes again the values
ξ = 0 and ξ = 0.147. The security parameter is ǫsec = 10
−10 in Fig. 4 and ǫsec = 10
−8 in Fig. 6.
For comparison, these two figures also show the asymptotic secret key rate when Alice and Bob use two decoy
settings. In this asymptotic case, we find that the degradation on the achievable key rate, when compared to the
scenario r = 0, is only about 10 km (20 km) when r = 0.02 (r = 0.05).
In the finite-key regime, however, we obtain that the presence of intensity fluctuations seems to strongly limit the
key generation rate if Alice and Bob do not know their probability distribution but only know the interval where the
fluctuations lie in. For instance, when N = 1011 and r = 0 (see Fig. 2) Alice and Bob can distribute a secret key
over more than 100 km. However, to achieve a similar secret key rate performance when the intensity fluctuation of
the source is 2% (i.e., the parameter r = 0.02) they need to exchange about N = 1015 signals. The main technical
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FIG. 6: (Colour online) Secret key rate (per pulse) in logarithmic scale vs fibre length when the intensity fluctuation is 5%.
The security parameter is ǫsec = 10
−8 and the total number of signals sent by Alice is N = 10s with s = {14, 15} (from left to
right). The rightmost two lines correspond to the asymptotic secret key rate with two decoy settings. The solid lines denote
the case ξ = 0 (i.e., the perfect encoding scenario) while the dashed lines show the case ξ = 0.147 (which is equivalent to a
phase modulation error of 8.42◦). The experimental parameters are described in the main text.
FIG. 7: (Colour online) Postprocessing block size |Zks | vs fibre length for a fixed total number of signals N = 10
s sent by
Alice, with s = {14, 15} when the intensity fluctuation is 5% (from left to right). The solid lines correspond to the case ξ=0
and the dashed lines are for ξ=0.147.
reason for this behaviour seems to be the fact that Azuma’s inequality [39] has a relatively slow convergence speed
when compared to the Chernoff bound [37] and the Multiplicative Chernoff bound [13].
As a side remark, let us mention that when r = 0.05 and N = 1014 we find that the achievable secret key rate is
basically zero unless we increase the security parameter ǫsec from ǫsec = 10
−10 to ǫsec = 10
−8. This is illustrated in
Fig. 6.
Finally, Figs. 5 and 7 show the postprocessing block size |Zks | as a function of the distance when N = 10s with
s = {14, 15} for the 2% intensity fluctuation case and for the 5% intensity fluctuation case, respectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
In summary, we have provided explicit security bounds for the loss-tolerant QKD protocol in the finite-key regime.
On the application front, our results constitute an important step towards practical QKD with imperfect light sources,
in that the resulting security performance is robust against encoding inaccuracies like, for instance, optical misalign-
ments. Furthermore, our results take into account intensity fluctuations in the light source, which is a common
experimental fact. Our results highlight the importance of the stable control of the intensity modulator as well as the
need for a precise estimation of its intensity, which is not often sufficiently emphasised in the experiments. On a more
general outlook, it would be of great practical interest to incorporate our results into measurement-device-independent
QKD (mdiQKD) [11].
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APPENDIX A: DERIVATION OF THE SECURITY BOUND
Here we present the calculations for the security bound given by equation (2). The security analysis is based on
the universal composable security framework [28, 29].
Recall that after privacy amplification, the joint state shared by Alice, Bob and Eve is described by the following
classical-quantum state
ρactualSASBE =
∑
sA,sB
p(sA, sB)|sA, sB〉〈sA, sB|SASB ⊗ ρsA,sBE , (38)
where sA and sB are the classical bit strings for the keys, associated with orthonormal states |sA〉 and |sB〉 in a
Hilbert space. Here, p(sA, sB) denotes the distribution of the keys and ρ
sA,sB
E is the quantum state of Eve’s system
conditioned on SA = sA and SB = sB. In the ideal scenario, the joint state is described by
ρidealSASBE =
1
2|s|
∑
s
|s, s〉〈s, s|SASB ⊗ ρE, (39)
where SA = SB = s and ρE is an arbitrary quantum state held by Eve. Using the security definition stated in the
main text, a ǫsec-secure QKD protocol satisfies
1
2
∥∥ρactualSASBE − ρidealSASBE∥∥1 ≤ ǫsec. (40)
Furthermore, if the security parameter ǫsec is appropriately chosen, it can be seen as the sum of errors in the correctness
and secrecy, i.e., ǫsec = ǫs + ǫc. To see this, let us introduce an intermediate state,
ρinterSASAE =
∑
sA
p(sA)|sA, sA〉〈sA, sA|SASA ⊗ ρsAE , (41)
which is just a trivial classical extension of Alice’s state. Then, by using the triangle inequality property of the trace
distance metric, we have
1
2
∥∥ρactualSASBE − ρidealSASBE∥∥1 ≤ 12
∥∥ρactualSASBE − ρinterSASAE∥∥1 + 12
∥∥ρinterSASAE − ρidealSASBE∥∥1 .
Fixing the first term on the R.H.S to ǫc gives
ǫc =
1
2
∥∥ρactualSASBE − ρinterSASAE∥∥1 ≥ 12
∥∥ρactualSASB − ρinterSASA∥∥1 = Pr[SA 6= SB],
where the inequality is due to the fact that the trace distance metric is contractive under any trace-preserving operation
(in our case, the partial trace operation). Similarly, by fixing the second term to ǫs we have
ǫs =
1
2
∥∥ρinterSASAE − ρidealSASBE∥∥1 ≥ 12
∥∥ρinterSAE − ρidealSAE∥∥1 .
Therefore, fixing ǫsec = ǫs + ǫc gives the desired decomposition.
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From [35], the lower bound on the secret key length of our protocol is written as
ℓ ≥
⌊
mL0 +m
L
1 [1− Γ]− λEC − log2
2
ǫc
⌋
, (42)
where mL0 and m
L
1 are the lower bounds on the detection events of the vacuum and the single-photon emission,
respectively, and mL1Γ = m
L
1 (h(e
U
ph)+ δ) is the number of rounds performing the random hashing to correct the phase
error, which is equivalent to the number of bits sacrificed in the privacy amplification step of the protocol. The
parameter λEC denotes the number of bits consumed in bit error correction, and ⌈log2 1/ǫc⌉ ≤ log2 2/ǫc is the length
of the hash that Alice sends to Bob for the error verification using the universal2 hash functions. From [7] and [36], we
have that ǫs can be bounded by ǫs ≤
√
1− (1− η)(1 − 2−mL1 δ+1) ≤
√
η + 2−m
L
1 δ+1. Therefore, the secret key length
is obtained as
ℓ ≥
⌊
mL0 +m
L
1 [1− h(eUph)]− log2
2
ǫ2s − η
− λEC − log2
2
ǫc
⌋
, (43)
where we consider η as a fixed value in this paper.
APPENDIX B: TECHNICAL LEMMAS
In this Appendix we introduce four different concentration inequalities which are used throughout this paper.
First, we introduce the stochastic model that is assumed in Lemmas 1, 2 and 3.
Stochastic model in Lemmas 1, 2 and 3.
Let X1, X2..., XN be a set of independent Bernoulli random variables that satisfy P(Xi = 1) = pi, and let
X :=
∑N
i=1Xi. The expected value of X is denoted as µ := E[X ] =
∑N
i=1 pi. An observed outcome of X is
represented as x.
Lemma 1. Chernoff bound [37]
This bound requires the knowledge of µ. It relates x with µ as
x = µ+ δC, (44)
except with error probability ǫC + ǫˆC, where the fluctuation term δC lies in the interval δC ∈ [−∆C, ∆ˆC] with
∆C = gC(µ, ǫC) and ∆ˆC = gˆC(µ, ǫˆC), where gC(x, y) =
√
2x ln 1/y and gˆC(x, y) =
√
3x ln 1/y. Here the parameter
ǫC (ǫˆC) denotes the probability that x < µ−∆C (x > µ+ ∆ˆC). Equation (44) holds if both 0 < gC(1/µ, ǫC) < 1 and
0 < gˆC(1/µ, ǫˆC) < 1 are met.
Lemma 2. Hoeffding bound [38]
This bound does not require the knowledge of µ. It relates µ and x as
µ = x+ δH, (45)
except with error probability ǫH + ǫˆH, where the fluctuation term δH lies in the interval δH ∈ [−∆H, ∆ˆH] with
∆H = gH(N, ǫH) and ∆ˆH = gH(N, ǫˆH), and where gH(x, y) =
√
x/2 ln 1/y.
Lemma 3. Multiplicative Chernoff bound [13]
This bound does not require the knowledge of µ. It combines Lemma 1 and 2 above. It uses Lemma 2 to estimate a
lower bound on µ that is then basically used in combination with Lemma 1. In particular, let µL = x−
√
N/2 ln1/ǫH
for certain ǫH > 0. Then, if the following two conditions are satisfied: (2ǫˆ
−1
M )
1/µL ≤ exp(9/32) and ǫ−1/µLM < exp(1/3)
with ǫˆM, ǫM > 0, this Lemma states that µ and x can be related as
µ = x+ δM, (46)
except with error probability ǫH + ǫM + ǫˆM, where δM lies in the interval [−∆M , ∆ˆM ] with ∆ˆM = gM(x, ǫˆ4M/16) and
∆M = gM(x, ǫM
3/2), and where gM(x, y) =
√
2x ln(y−1).
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Lemma 4. Azuma’s inequality [39, 40]
This result plays a crucial role in our security analysis. It is applicable to any stochastic model as long as the
Martingale and the Bounded difference conditions (BDC) are satisfied. In particular, a sequence of random variables
X(0), X(1), . . . is called a Martingale if and only if E[X(l+1)|X(0), X(1), . . . , X(l)] = X(l) for all non-negative integer
l, where E[·] represents the expectation value. On the other hand, X(0), X(1), . . . is said to fulfil the BDC if there
exists c(l) > 0 such that |X(l+1) −X(l)| ≤ c(l) for all non-negative integer l.
Let us consider N trials of a random variable X(l), where l refers to the lth trial. If X(l) is a Martingale and satisfies
the BDC with c(l) = 1 then Azuma’s inequality guarantees that
Pr[|X(N) −X(0)| > Nδ] ≤ 2e−Nδ
2
2 (47)
for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
Let us now define the following random variable for the lth trial,
X(l) := Λ(l) −
l∑
u=1
P (u|ξ0, . . . , ξu−1), (48)
where Λ(l) represents the actual number of events of the form X(l) = 1 observed among the first l trials, and
P (u|ξ0, ..., ξu−1) is the conditional probability of having the event “1” in the uth trial conditioned on the first u − 1
outcomes ξ0, . . . , ξu−1. In this scenario, it is straightforward to show that the random variables given by equation
(48) are Martingale and satisfy the BDC with c(l) = 1. Hence, by applying Azuma’s inequality we have that
Pr[|Λ(N) −
N∑
u=1
P (u|ξ0, ..., ξu−1)| > Nδ] ≤ 2e−Nδ
2
2 . (49)
This means, in particular, that
Λ(N) =
N∑
u=1
P (u|ξ0, ..., ξu−1) + δA (50)
except with error probability ǫA+ǫˆA, where the parameter δA lies in the interval δA ∈ [−∆A, ∆ˆA] with ∆A = gA(N, ǫA)
and ∆ˆA = gA(N, ǫˆA), and where gA(x, y) =
√
2x ln(1/y).
APPENDIX C: DECOY-STATE ANALYSIS
In this Appendix we first present the detail of the decoy-state analysis for the intensity fluctuation case and then
we summarise all the equations for the decoy-state analysis, including those for the exact intensity control case. More
precisely, we describe the estimation procedure that we use in order to obtain a lower bound on the number of vacuum
contributions TZ,0, and both a lower and an upper bound on the number of single-photon contributions TZ,1.
1. Intensity fluctuation case
Here, we generalise the decoy-state method to cover the case where the source suffers from intensity fluctuations.
For this, as already mentioned previously, we shall consider that Alice and Bob only know the interval [k−, k+] where
the intensity k lies.
We begin by calculating the mean value 〈Zk〉. Our starting point is the random variable X(i|
−−→
i−1)
k for the ith trial
when both Alice and Bob select the Z basis. This random variable takes the value 1 if Alice chooses the intensity k
and, moreover, the generated signal is detected by Bob; otherwise it is 0. The term
−−→
i− 1 reflects the fact that X(i|
−−→
i−1)
k
may depend on all the previous i− 1 trials. With this notation, 〈Zk〉 can be expressed as
〈Zk〉 =
Nz∑
i=1
E[X
(i|
−−→
i−1)
k ] =
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(k ∧ det|Z), (51)
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where Nz is the number of events where both Alice and Bob select the Z basis. The probability p
(i|
−−→
i−1)(∗) denotes the
conditional probability that the event ∗ occurs in the ith trial conditioned on the results obtained in the previous i−1
trials, and the term k ∧ det|Z represents the event where Alice selects the intensity k and Bob detects the generated
signal given that both of them have chosen the Z basis. By using Bayes rule, we can rewrite equation (51) as
〈Zk〉 = pk
Nz∑
i=1
∞∑
n=0
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(n ∧ det|k ∧ Z) (52)
=
1
p2z
Nz∑
i=1
∞∑
n=0
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(k ∧ Z ∧ n ∧ det) (53)
=
1
p2z
Nz∑
i=1
∞∑
n=0
p(i)(k ∧ Z ∧ n)p(i|−−→i−1)(det|k ∧ Z ∧ n) (54)
= pk
Nz∑
i=1
∞∑
n=0
p(i)(n|k ∧ Z)p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|Z ∧ n), (55)
where pk is the probability that Alice chooses the intensity k; n denotes an n-photon signal; pz represents the
probability of selecting the Z basis; and p(i)(∗) is the probability that the event ∗ occurs in the ith trial. For
instance, p(i)(n|k ∧ Z) is the conditional probability that Alice emits an n-photon state in the ith trial given that
she has chosen the intensity k and both Alice and Bob have selected the Z basis in the ith trial. Note that in
the transformation from equation (54) to equation (55) we have used the property of the decoy-state method i.e.,
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|k ∧ Z ∧ n) = p(i|−−→i−1)(det|Z ∧ n).
In so doing, we obtain that 〈Zk〉 is upper bounded by
〈Zk〉 ≤ pk
Nz∑
i=1
∞∑
n=0
e−k
−
(k+)n
n!
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|Z ∧ n). (56)
Similarly, we find that
〈Zk〉 ≥ pk
Nz∑
i=1
∞∑
n=0
e−k
+
(k−)n
n!
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|Z ∧ n). (57)
Lower bound on the number of vacuum contributions
To obtain this bound, we first rewrite equations (56) and (57) for the cases k = kd2 and k = kd1, respectively. We
obtain the following two inequalities,
ek
−
d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉 ≤
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|0 ∧ Z) +
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|1 ∧ Z)k+d2 +
Nz∑
i=1
∑
n≥2
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|n ∧ Z) (k
+
d2)
n
n!
. (58)
ek
+
d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉 ≥
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|0 ∧ Z) +
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|1 ∧ Z)k−d1 +
Nz∑
i=1
∑
n≥2
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|n ∧ Z) (k
−
d1)
n
n!
, (59)
Next, we multiply equation (58) by k−d1 and equation (59) by k
+
d2, and we add both expressions. In so doing, we find
that
(k−d1 − k+d2)
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|0 ∧ Z) ≥ k
−
d1e
k−d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉 −
k+d2e
k+d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉
+ k−d1k
+
d2
Nz∑
i=1
∑
n≥2
(k−d1)
n−1 − (k+d2)n−1
n!
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|n ∧ Z)
≥ k−d1
ek
−
d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉 − k+d2
ek
+
d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉, (60)
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where the second inequality holds because k−d1 > k
+
d2.
As a result, we find that TZ,0 is lower bounded by
TZ,0 :=
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|0 ∧ Z) ≥ 1
k−d1 − k+d2
(
k−d1
ek
−
d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉 − k+d2
ek
+
d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉
)
. (61)
To estimate the expectation values 〈Zkd1〉 and 〈Zkd2〉, we use Azuma’s inequality because each trial of the random
variables X
(i|
−−→
i−1)
kd1
and X
(i|
−−→
i−1)
kd2
may depend on the previous ones.
Lower bound on the number of single-photon contributions
Here, we first particularise equations (56) and (57) for the cases k = kd1 and k = kd2, respectively. We have that
ek
−
d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉 ≤
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|0 ∧ Z) +
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|1 ∧ Z)(k+d1) +
∑
n≥2
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|n ∧ Z) (k
+
d1)
n
n!
. (62)
ek
+
d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉 ≥
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|0 ∧ Z) +
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|1 ∧ Z)(k−d2) +
∑
n≥2
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|n ∧ Z) (k
−
d2)
n
n!
, (63)
Next, we add both expressions and we obtain
ek
+
d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉+
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|1 ∧ Z)(k+d1) +
∑
n≥2
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|n ∧ Z) (k
+
d1)
n
n!
≥e
k−
d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉+
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|1 ∧ Z)(k−d2) +
∑
n≥2
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|n ∧ Z) (k
−
d2)
n
n!
. (64)
This last equation can be rewritten as
(k+d1 − k−d2)
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|1 ∧ Z) ≥ e
k−d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉 −
ek
+
d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉+
∑
n≥2
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|n ∧ Z) (k
−
d2)
n − (k+d1)n
n!
. (65)
Next, we evaluate the third term on the R.H.S of equation (65). This term is lower bounded by
∑
n≥2
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|n ∧ Z) (k
−
d2)
n − (k+d1)n
n!
≥ (k
−
d2)
2 − (k+d1)2
(k−s )2
∑
n≥2
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|n ∧ Z) (k
−
s )
n
n!
, (66)
because when the conditions n ≥ 2, k+d1 > k−d2 and k−s > k+d1 + k−d2 are satisfied we have that (k−d2)n − (k+d1)n ≥
[(k−d2)
2 − (k+d1)2](k−s )n−2. If we now use equation (57) for k = ks, we have that
∑
n≥2
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|n ∧ Z) (k
−
s )
n
n!
≤ e
k+s
pks
〈Zks〉 −
Nz∑
i=1
(
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|0 ∧ Z) + k−s p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|1 ∧ Z)
)
. (67)
The R.H.S of equation (66) can be lower bounded using the R.H.S of equation (67). This is so because k+d1 > k
−
d2 and
therefore the term [(k−d2)
2 − (k+d1)2]/(k−s )2 < 0 in equation (66). Hence, we have that the third term on the R.H.S of
equation (65) is lower bounded by
∑
n≥2
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|n ∧ Z) (k
−
d2)
n − (k+d1)n
n!
≥ (k
−
d2)
2 − (k+d1)2
(k−s )2
[ek+s
pks
〈Zks〉
−
Nz∑
i=1
(
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|0 ∧ Z) + k−s p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|1 ∧ Z)
)]
.
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That is, if we now combine equations (65) and (68) we find that
(k+d1 − k−d2)
{k−s − (k+d1 + k−d2)
k−s
} Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|1 ∧ Z) ≥ e
k−d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉 −
ek
+
d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉
− (k
+
d1)
2 − (k−d2)2
(k−s )2
(ek+s
pks
〈Zks〉 − T LZ,0
)
, (69)
which directly gives us a lower bound on TZ,1,
TZ,1 : =
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|1 ∧ Z)
≥ k
−
s
(k+d1 − k−d2)(k−s − k+d1 − k−d2)
[ek−d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉 −
ek
+
d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉 −
(k+d1)
2 − (k−d2)2
(k−s )2
(ek+s
pks
〈Zks〉 − T LZ,0
)]
. (70)
Upper bound on the number of single-photon contributions
By adding equations (58) and (59), we have that
(k−d1 − k+d2)
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|1 ∧ Z) ≤ e
k+d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉 −
ek
−
d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉+
∑
n≥2
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|n ∧ Z) (k
+
d2)
n − (k−d1)n
n!
≤ e
k+d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉 −
ek
−
d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉, (71)
where the second inequality holds because k−d1 > k
+
d2. This means, in particular, that TZ,1 is upper bounded by
TZ,1 =
Nz∑
i=1
p(i|
−−→
i−1)(det|1 ∧ Z) ≤ 1
k−d1 − k+d2
(ek+d1
pkd1
〈Zkd1〉 −
ek
−
d2
pkd2
〈Zkd2〉
)
. (72)
2. Summary of the decoy-state analysis
Here, we summarise all the equations needed in the decoy-state method, including those for the exact intensity
control case.
Lower bound on the number of vacuum contributions
Let Decoy0(ay, by
′) denote a lower bound on the number of events where Alice generates a vacuum state using the
signal intensity and the basis setting a ∈ {Z,X} to encode a bit value y ∈ {0, 1}, and Bob observes the bit value
y′ ∈ {0, 1} when he measures the received signal using the basis b ∈ {Z,X}.
Decoy0(ay, by
′) =
p−(ks ∧ 0)
k−d1 − k+d2
(k−d1ek−d2
pkd2
〈ayby′−kd2〉 −
k+d2e
k+d1
pkd1
〈ayby′+kd1〉
)
, (73)
where the parameters 〈ayby′−kd2〉 and 〈ayby
′+
kd1〉 are defined in a similar way like equations (9) and (10) for the exact
intensity control case and like equations (20) and (21) for the intensity-fluctuation case, respectively. The probability
p−(ks ∧ 0) is a lower bound on p(ks ∧ 0) which denotes the probability that Alice selects the signal intensity setting
and sends a vacuum state.
Lower bound on the number of single-photon contributions
Let Decoy1(ay, by
′) denote a lower bound on the number of events where Alice prepares a single-photon state using
the signal intensity and the basis setting a ∈ {Z,X} to encode a bit value y ∈ {0, 1}, and Bob observes the bit value
y′ ∈ {0, 1} when he measures the received signal using the basis b ∈ {Z,X}.
Decoy1(ay, by
′) =
p−(ks ∧ 1)k−s
(k+d1 − k−d2)(k−s − k+d1 − k−d2)
[ ek−d1
pkd1
〈ayby′−kd1〉 −
ek
+
d2
pkd2
〈ayby′+kd2〉
+
(k+d1)
2 − (k−d2)2
(k−s )2
(Decoy0(ay, by′)
p−(ks ∧ 0) −
eks〈ayby′+ks〉
pks
)]
, (74)
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where the probability p−(ks ∧ 1) is a lower bound on p(ks ∧ 1) which denotes the probability that Alice selects the
signal intensity setting and sends a single-photon state.
Upper bound on the number of single-photon contributions
Let Decoy1(ay, by
′) denote an upper bound on the number of events where Alice prepares a single-photon state using
the signal intensity and the basis setting a ∈ {Z,X} to encode a bit value y ∈ {0, 1}, and Bob observes the bit value
y′ ∈ {0, 1} when he measures the received signal using the basis b ∈ {Z,X}.
Decoy1(ay, by
′) =
p+(ks ∧ 1)
k−d1 − k+d2
(ek+d1
pkd1
〈ayby′+kd1〉 −
ek
−
d2
pkd2
〈ayby′−kd2〉
)
, (75)
where the probability p+(ks ∧ 1) is an upper bound on p(ks ∧ 1).
APPENDIX D: PHASE ERROR RATE ESTIMATION
In this Appendix we explain how to derive equation (36). That is, we obtain an upper bound on the number of
phase errors associated to the single-photon pulses emitted by Alice when she selects the signal intensity setting, both
Alice and Bob use the Z basis, and Bob obtains a successful detection event (i.e., y′ 6= ∅). As we are interested in the
phase error rate defined in the single-photon emission events and all the statistics associated with the single-photons
can be estimated using the decoy state method, in the virtual protocol we only consider the cases where Alice emits
single photons.
For this, in the security proof we consider a virtual protocol that based on the complementarity argument [25]
is equivalent to the actual protocol. In the virtual scheme, Alice prepares an ancilla qubit which is entangled with
the pulse that she sends to Bob. Importantly, from Eve’s viewpoint both protocols are completely indistinguishable
because they emit the same quantum states and announce the same classical information.
Let us start our analysis by introducing the following joint states, which we shall denote as |ψ˜jz 〉A1,B. They are a
purification of the signals ρ˜jz with j ∈ {0, 1} (see equation (32)),
|ψ˜jz 〉A1,B =
√
P jz0 |0〉A1 |φjz0 〉B +
√
P jz1 |1〉A1 |φjz1 〉B, (76)
where the index A1 represents the ancilla system and the index B is the system that Alice sends to Bob. In addition,
we define the state:
|Ψ˜z〉A1,A2,B =
1√
2
(
|0〉A2 |ψ˜0z 〉A1,B + |1〉A2 |ψ˜1z〉A1,B
)
, (77)
where the ancilla system A2 stores the bit information. The aim of the virtual protocol is to quantify how accurately
Bob can estimate Alice’s measurement outcome if she would measure system A2 in the complementarity basis (i.e.,
if she would use the POVM MX,A2 = {|+〉〈+|, |−〉〈−|}, where |±〉 = 1/
√
2(|0〉 ± |1〉)). This way one can characterise
the information that Eve could have obtained about the raw key [25]. Note that equation (77) can be rewritten as
|Ψ˜z〉A1,A2,B =
√
1 + 〈ψ˜0z |ψ˜1z〉A1,B
2
|+〉A2 |ψ˜vir0x 〉A1,B +
√
1− 〈ψ˜0z |ψ˜1z 〉A1,B
2
|−〉A2 |ψ˜vir1x 〉A1,B, (78)
where the normalised virtual states |ψ˜virjx 〉A1,B, with j ∈ {0, 1}, are defined as
|ψ˜virjx 〉A1,B =
|ψ˜0z〉A1,B + (−1)j|ψ˜1z 〉A1,B√
2
[
1 + (−1)j〈ψ˜0z |ψ˜1z 〉A1,B
] . (79)
Let us now introduce some additional notation before we describe in detail the different steps of the virtual protocol.
In particular, the states prepared by Alice in the virtual protocol are given by
|φ〉sh,A1,B =
5∑
c=1
√
P (c)|c〉sh|φ(c)〉A1,B, (80)
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where the shield system sh belongs to Alice’s laboratory, the states |φ(c)〉A1,B have the form
|φ(1)〉A1,B = |ψ˜vir0x 〉A1,B,
|φ(2)〉A1,B = |ψ˜vir1x 〉A1,B,
|φ(3)〉A1,B = |ψ˜0z 〉A1,B,
|φ(4)〉A1,B = |ψ˜1z 〉A1,B,
|φ(5)〉A1,B = |ψ˜0x〉A1,B, (81)
and the probabilities P (c) are given by
P (1) =
p2z
2
(
1 + 〈ψ˜0z |ψ˜1z 〉A1,B
)
,
P (2) =
p2z
2
(
1− 〈ψ˜0z |ψ˜1z 〉A1,B
)
,
P (3) = P (4) =
pzpx
2
,
P (5) = px. (82)
Also, we define Bob’s POVM for the Z and the X basis measurement as MZ,B = {MZ0,MZ1,MZf} and MX,B =
{MX0,MX1,MXf}, respectively. Here, the operator MZ(X)f corresponds to the inconclusive outcome in the Z (X)
basis. Importantly, in the security analysis we assume that this operator is the same for both basis, i.e., Mf :=
MZf = MXf . This assumption allows us to conceptually delay Bob’s measurement basis choice until he is certain to
obtain a conclusive result. That is, we can consider that Bob first conducts a filter operation with Kraus operators
D = {√I −Mf ,
√
Mf} followed by the Z orX basis measurement, which we redefine as {MZ0,MZ1} and {MX0,MX1},
respectively.
Next we present the steps of the virtual protocol in detail.
Virtual protocol
Alice repeats the first step n1 times, where n1 is the number of single-photon emissions generated by Alice in the
actual protocol within the set |Zks |.
1. Preparation
Alice prepares the state |φ〉sh,A1,B given by equation (80). Afterwards, she sends Bob system B over a quantum
channel and delays her measurement on system sh until step 3.
2. Filter operation
Bob performs on system B the filter operation D and, if this operation succeeds, he stores this system in a quantum
memory. We will denote the set of successful filter results as S, and |S| = N1.
3. Collective measurement
Alice and Bob perform on the states in the set S a collective measurement characterised by the POVM elements
FΩ,s, with Ω ∈ {1, 2, ..., 6} and s ∈ {0, 1} (see equation (85)) on the states in the set S.
4. Classical communication
Alice announces the Z (X) basis choice over an authenticated public channel when the result of her measurement
in step 3 is Ω = 1, 2, 3, 4 (Ω = 5, 6). Then, Bob announces the Z (X) basis choice, also over an authenticated
public channel, when the measurement outcome in step 3 is Ω = 1, 2, 6 (Ω = 3, 4, 5) to ensure that the classical
information declared in both the actual and the virtual protocols coincide (see the main text below for further
details). In addition, Bob declares the value of s when Ω = 3, 4, 5, 6.
5. Estimation of the number of phase errors
Alice and Bob calculate an upper bound on the number of phase errors. This upper bound is given by
NUph = Λ
(N1)
1,1 + Λ
(N1)
2,0 , (83)
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where Λ
(N1)
Ω,s denotes the number of outcomes associated to the operator FΩ,s after N1 trials, and Λ
(N1)
Ω,s is an upper
bound on Λ
(N1)
Ω,s .
The size of the set S (see step 2 of the virtual protocol) is upper bounded by
|S| = N1 ≤
∑
a,b∈{Z,X}
∑
y,y′∈{0,1}
Decoy1(ay, by
′), (84)
where the parameter Decoy1(ay, by
′) is defined in Appendix C. Also, the POVM elements FΩ,s of Alice and Bob’s
collective measurement are given by
FΩ,s = P [|Ω〉sh]⊗MXs when Ω ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4},
F5,s = P [|5〉sh]⊗ pxMXs,
F6,s = P [|5〉sh]⊗ pzMZs. (85)
These POVM elements satisfy
∑
s∈{0,1}
∑
Ω∈{1,...,6} FΩ,s = Ish ⊗ IB.
It is easy to demonstrate that from Eve’s viewpoint the virtual protocol described above is completely equivalent
to the actual protocol. Indeed, the quantum states that Alice sends to Bob are exactly the same in both protocols.
Also, both schemes declare precisely the same classical information. To see this last point, let us further clarify the
fourth step of the virtual protocol. In particular, note that when Ω = 1(2) the state that Alice sends to Bob in the
virtual protocol is TrA1P [|ψ˜0(1)x〉A1B] and Bob uses the X basis. However, in this case, Alice and Bob announce the Z
basis. In so doing, the actual and virtual protocols are indistinguishable. This is so because in the actual protocol the
events Ω = 1 or 2 are used to generate a secret key, i .e., in these events both Alice and Bob select, and therefore also
declare, the Z basis. Then, the virtual protocol has to do the same declaration, otherwise it could be distinguished
from the actual protocol. That is, with our definition of the virtual protocol we guarantee that it produces precisely
the same classical information as the actual protocol.
Next, we present the estimation method that we use in order to upper bound the quantities Λ
(N1)
1,1 and Λ
(N1)
2,0 using
experimentally observed values. For this, we consider the sequence of random variables X
(l)
Ω,s, with l = 1, ..., N1, given
by
X
(l)
Ω,s = Λ
(l)
Ω,s −
l∑
u=1
PΩ,s(u|ξ0, ..., ξu−1), (86)
where PΩ,s(u|ξ0, ..., ξu−1) is the conditional probability of obtaining the values Ω and s in the collective measurement
performed in the uth trial of the third step of the virtual protocol, conditioned on the first u−1 measurement outcomes
from the collective measurements ξ0, ..., ξu−1. To obtain this conditional probability we use the following joint state
in N1 trials,
|Φ〉sh,A1,B = |φ−−→u−1〉sh,A1,B|φu〉sh,A1,B|φ−−−−→N1−u〉sh,A1,B, (87)
where |φ−−→
u−1
〉sh,A1,B, |φu〉sh,A1,B, and |φ−−−−→N1−u〉sh,A1,B represent, respectively, Alice’s prepared states in the first u − 1
trials, in the uth trial, and in the rest of trials.
Let UBE denote Eve’s unitary transformation on Bob’s system B and on her system E. We have that
UBE|Φ〉sh,A1,B|0〉E =
∑
t
Bt,B|Φ〉sh,A1,B|t〉E, (88)
where Bt,B denotes the Kraus operator which acts on system B depending on Eve’s measurement outcome of her
ancilla. Now we consider Alice and Bob’s collective measurement. In particular, let Mshv ,sv represent the Kraus
operator associated with the vth (1 ≤ v ≤ u) measurement outcome of Alice’s system sh and Bob’s system. Also, let
Ou−1,sh,B denote Alice and Bob’s joint measurement operator up to u− 1 trials. It can be written as
Ou−1,sh,B =
u−1⊗
v=1
Mshv ,sv(Ish ⊗
√
1−Mf). (89)
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We shall denote the measurement outcomes of the first u − 1 trials as Ou−1. Then, after Eve’s intervention and
conditioned on the fact of obtaining the measurement results Ou−1, we have that the normalised uth state of Alice’s
system sh and Bob’s system B, which we shall represent as ρsh,B
u|
−−→
u−1
, is given by
ρsh,B
u|
−−→
u−1
=
σsh,Bu|Ou−1
Tr
(
σsh,Bu|Ou−1
) , (90)
where the state σsh,Bu|Ou−1 has the form
σsh,Bu|Ou−1 :=
∑
t
Tru¯
(
P [Ou−1,sh,BBt,B|Φ〉sh,A1,B]
)
. (91)
Here, Tru¯ is the trace over all systems except for the uth systems sh and B. Equation (91) can be rewritten as follows:
σsh,Bu|Ou−1 =
∑
t
∑
−−→
u−1,
−−−−→
N1−u
Tr
(u)
A1
(
P [〈−−−→u− 1|〈−−−−→N1 − u|Ou−1,sh,BBt,B|φ−−→u−1〉sh,A1,B|φu〉sh,A1,B|φ−−−−→N1−u〉sh,A1,B]
)
=
∑
t
∑
−−→
u−1,
−−−−→
N1−u
Tr
(u)
A1
(
P [A
−−→
u−1,
−−−→
N1−u
t,B|Ou−1
|φu〉sh,A1,B]
)
, (92)
where Tr
(u)
A1
represents the trace over the uth A1 system, the states |−−−→u− 1〉 and |−−−−→N1 − u〉 denote an orthogonal basis
for the first u− 1 systems and the last N1 − u systems, respectively, and
A
−−→
u−1,
−−−→
N1−u
t,B|Ou−1
:= 〈−−−→u− 1|〈−−−−→N1 − u|Ou−1,sh,BBt,B|φ−−→u−1〉sh,A1,B|φ−−−−→N1−u〉sh,A1,B (93)
is the Kraus operator acting on the uth system conditioned on the measurement outcomes Ou−1.
Therefore, we obtain that the conditional probability defined in equation (86) for Ω ∈ {1, ..., 6} is given by
PΩ,s(u|ξ0, ..., ξu−1) = Tr

FΩ,s
E(ρsh,B
u|
−−→
u−1
)
Tr
[
E(ρsh,B
u|
−−→
u−1
)
]


=
Q(Ω)
Tr
[
E(ρsh,B
u|
−−→
u−1
)
]
Tr(σsh,Bu|Ou−1 )
Tr
[
M(u|
−−→
u−1)
Xs TrA1P [|φ(Ω)〉A1,B]
]
=: Q(Ω)T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs
[
TrA1P [|φ(Ω)〉A1,B]
]
, (94)
where E(ρ) := (Ish ⊗
√
I −Mf)ρ(Ish ⊗
√
I −Mf)†, the probability Q(Ω) = P (Ω) for Ω ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, Q(5) = pxP (5)
and Q(6) = pzP (5), the operator M(u|
−−→
u−1)
Xs :=
∑
t
∑
−−→
u−1,
−−−−→
N1−u
(
√
I −Mf A
−−→
u−1,
−−−−→
N1−u
t,B|Ou−1
)†MXs(
√
I −Mf A
−−→
u−1,
−−−−→
N1−u
t,B|Ou−1
), the
states |φ(Ω)〉A1,B are defined in equation (81), and T(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs
[
TrA1P [|φ(Ω)〉A1,B]
]
is the uth conditional probability that
Bob’s measurement outcome in the X basis is s ∈ {0, 1} given that Alice sends him the state TrA1P [|φ(Ω)〉A1,B] and
the filter operation succeeds conditioned on the first u − 1 measurement results. For convenience, we shall refer to
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs
[A] as the transmission rate of A.
If we now apply Azuma’s inequality (see Lemma 4 in Appendix B), we obtain
∣∣∣ N1∑
u=1
PΩ,s(u|ξ0, ..., ξu−1)− Λ(N1)Ω,s
∣∣∣ ≤ ∆sA,Ω, (95)
except with error probability ǫsA,Ω, where ∆
s
A,Ω = gA(N1, ǫ
s
A,Ω).
By combining this result with that from equation (94), we have that
Λ
(N1)
Ω,s −∆sA,Ω
Q(Ω)
≤
N1∑
u=1
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs
[
TrA1P [|φ(Ω)〉A1,B]
]
≤ Λ
(N1)
Ω,s +∆
s
A,Ω
Q(Ω)
. (96)
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Note that the parameters Λ
(N1)
Ω,s , with Ω ∈ {3, 4, 5}, can be upper and lower bounded using the decoy-state method.
We shall denote the failure probability of this estimation as ǫZ0,Xs, ǫZ1,Xs and ǫX0,Xs, respectively.
As a result, we obtain bounds on
∑N1
u=1 T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs
[
TrA1P [|φ(Ω)〉A1,B]
]
that maximise the number of phase errors Nph
in the single-photon emissions within the set |Zks |. They are denoted as NMXs(Ω) and have the form
NMXs(3) :=
{Decoy1(Z0, Xs)−∆sA,3
Q(3)
or
Decoy1(Z0, Xs) + ∆
s
A,3
Q(3)
}
, (97)
NMXs(4) :=
{Decoy1(Z1, Xs)−∆sA,4
Q(4)
or
Decoy1(Z1, Xs) + ∆
s
A,4
Q(4)
}
, (98)
NMXs(5) :=
{Decoy1(X0, Xs)−∆sA,5
Q(5)
or
Decoy1(X0, Xs) + ∆
s
A,5
Q(5)
}
. (99)
When Ω ∈ {1, 2}, the quantity T(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[
ρ˜virsx
]
, with s ∈ {0, 1}, represents the transmission rate of the virtual
states ρ˜virsx = TrB(P [|ψ˜virsx 〉A1,B]), with |ψ˜virsx 〉A1,B given by equation (79). This quantity can be decomposed into the
transmission rate of the Pauli operators σI , σX and σZ . However, for later convenience, we will decompose it as a
function of ρ˜0z and ρ˜1z , together with σI , σX and σZ . Here, the states ρ˜0z and ρ˜1z are defined in equation (31). In
particular, from equation (79) we find that
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[
ρ˜virsx
]
=
1
2
[
1 + (−1)s〈ψ˜0z |ψ˜1z〉A1,B
]
{
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜0z] + T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜1z] + (−1)s
(
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[
TrB(P [|ψ˜0z 〉〈ψ˜1z |A1,B])
]
+T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[
TrB(P [|ψ˜1z 〉〈ψ˜0z |A1,B])
])}
=
1
2{1 + (−1)s(√P 0z0 P 1z0 〈φ0z0 |φ1z0 〉+√P 0z1 P 1z1 〈φ0z1 |φ1z1 〉)}
[
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜0z] + T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜1z]
+ (−1)s
1∑
t=0
√
P 0zt P
1z
t
{
(a0zt a
1z
t + b
0z
t b
1z
t )T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[σI ] + (a
0z
t b
1z
t + a
0z
t b
1z
t )T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[σX ]
+ (a0zt a
1z
t − b0zt b1zt )T(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[σZ ]
]
, (100)
where we have used equation (76) in the second equality and see equation (35) for the definition of aSt and b
S
t .
In addition, we have that the transmission rate of ρ˜0z, ρ˜1z and ρ˜0x can be decomposed using the Pauli operators as
follows 

T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜0z ]
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜1z ]
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜0x]

 =

 1/2 r0zx /2 r0zz /21/2 r1zx /2 r1zz /2
1/2 r0xx /2 r
0x
z /2




T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[σI ]
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[σX ]
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[σZ ]

 =: A


T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[σI ]
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[σX ]
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[σZ ]

 . (101)
Hence, the transmission rate of the Pauli operators can be described as


T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[σI ]
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[σX ]
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[σZ ]

 = A−1


T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜0z ]
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜1z ]
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜0x]

 , (102)
where the inverse matrix A−1 is given in equation (37).
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Now, if we combine equations (100), (102) and (96), we obtain that Nph is upper bounded by
Nph = Λ
(N1)
1,1 + Λ
(N1)
2,0 ≤
1∑
s=0
P (s+ 1)
N1∑
u=1
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[
ρ˜virsx
]
+∆s⊕1A,s+1
=
1∑
s=0
P (s+ 1)
2{1 + (−1)s(√P 0z0 P 1z0 〈φ0z0 |φ1z0 〉+√P 0z1 P 1z1 〈φ0z1 |φ1z1 〉)}
[
N1∑
u=1
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜0z ] +
N1∑
u=1
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜1z ]
+ (−1)s
1∑
t=0
√
P 0zt P
1z
t
{
Ct,0
N1∑
u=1
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜0z] + Ct,1
N1∑
u=1
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜1z] + Ct,2
N1∑
u=1
T
(u|
−−→
u−1)
MXs⊕1
[ρ˜0x]
}]
+∆s⊕1A,s+1. (103)
Finally, by using the results given by equations (97)-(99), we find that
Nph ≤
1∑
s=0
P (s+ 1)
2{1 + (−1)s(√P 0z0 P 1z0 〈φ0z0 |φ1z0 〉+√P 0z1 P 1z1 〈φ0z1 |φ1z1 〉)}
[
NMXs(3) +NMXs(4)
+ (−1)s
1∑
t=0
√
P 0zt P
1z
t
{
Ct,0NMXs(3) + Ct,1NMXs(4) + Ct,2NMXs(5)
}]
+∆s⊕1A,s+1 (104)
=: NUph, (105)
except with error probability
εph = ǫ
1
A,1 + ǫ
0
A,2 +
∑
s∈{0,1},Ω∈{3,4,5}
ǫsA,Ω +
∑
s∈{0,1}
(ǫZ0,Xs + ǫZ1,Xs + ǫX0,Xs), (106)
where ǫsA,Ω is the failure probability that equation (95) does not hold for Ω ∈ {1, ..., 5} and s ∈ {0, 1}. Also, ǫZ0(1),Xs
and ǫX0,Xs are the failure probabilities of the decoy state method i.e., the failure probabilities of the estimation of
Λ
(N1)
3(4),s and Λ
(N1)
5,s , respectively.
APPENDIX E: SIMULATION
In this Appendix we present the calculations used to obtain Figs. 2, 4 and 6 in the main text.
In particular, we consider that Alice sends Bob pairs of coherent states of the form |√krefeiχ〉r|
√
ksige
i(χ+θA+∆θA)〉s,
and we set Alice’s (Bob’s) phase modulation error to ∆θA = ξθA/π (∆B = −∆A). Also, we assume a Gaussian
distribution for the intensity fluctuations of the laser within an interval [k−, k+]. That is, we consider that the
probability density function of the fluctuations is given by pG(k) = A exp[−(k − µ)2/2σ2], where µ is the desired
value (e.g., ks, kd1, and kd2), the dispersion σ
2 has the form σ2 = rµ/5, and the normalisation factor A is such that∫ k+
k− pG(k)dk = 1.
Calculation of the parameters mL0 and m
L
1
For this, we need to obtain |Zk| for all k ∈ K. Afterwards, we simply apply the procedure described in section IV.A
(for the exact intensity control case) and in section IV.B (for the intensity fluctuation case).
We consider that the total number of pulses sent by Alice using the intensity setting k is given by Nk = Npk,
where N denotes the total number of transmissions until the conditions in the Sifting step of the protocol are met.
The total system loss ηsy := ηdetηch includes the channel loss and the detection efficiency of Bob’s detectors. The
conditional probability p(k)(Zj|Zi) that Bob obtains the bit j ∈ {0, 1} using the Z basis given that Alice sends him
a bit i encoded with the intensity k and also in the Z basis can be written as
p(k)(Z0|Z0) =
∫ k+
k−
pG(k)
[
1− (1− pd)e−ηsyk
]
dk, (107)
p(k)(Z1|Z0) = pd, (108)
p(k)(Zj|Z1) =
∫ k+
k−
pG(k)
[
1− (1− pd) exp
(
− ηsyk(1− (−1)
j cos ξ)
2
)]
dk. (109)
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The conditional probability p(k)(Zj ∧ Zj ⊕ 1|Zi) that Bob interprets the bit value j (after a random assignment of
double click events to single clicks events) when he uses the Z basis given that Alice sends him a pulse with the
intensity k, prepared in the Z basis, and encoding the bit value i is written as
p(k)(Zj ∧ Zj ⊕ 1|Zi) = p(k)(Zj|Zi)(1− p(k)(Zj ⊕ 1|Zi)) + 1
2
p(k)(Zj|Zi)p(k)(Zj ⊕ 1|Zi). (110)
To simulate the misalignment in the optical system we transform this probability as
P (k)(Zj ∧ Zj ⊕ 1|Zj) = p(k)(Zj ∧ Zj ⊕ 1|Zj)(1− emis), (111)
P (k)(Zj ⊕ 1 ∧ Zj|Zj) = p(k)(Zj ∧ Zj ⊕ 1|Zj)emis + p(k)(Zj ⊕ 1 ∧ Zj|Zj). (112)
In so doing, we obtain
|Zk| = Nkp2z
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
P (k)(Zj ∧ Zj ⊕ 1|Zi). (113)
The bit error rate in the Z basis when Alice sends Bob a pulse using the signal intensity is given by
ez =
∑
j∈{0,1} P
(ks)(Zj ⊕ 1 ∧ Zj|Zj)∑
i,j∈{0,1} P
(ks)(Zj ∧ Zj ⊕ 1|Zi) . (114)
Calculation of the parameter Nph
According to equation (36), we have that Nph is upper bounded by
Nph ≤
1− sin ξ2
2
(pz
px
)2
(Decoy1(X0, X1) + ∆
1
A,5) +
pz
px
(Decoy1(Z0, X0) + Decoy1(Z1, X0) + ∆
0
A,3 +∆
0
A,4)
− 1− sin
ξ
2
2
(pz
px
)2
(Decoy1(X0, X0) + ∆
0
A,5) + ∆A,1 +∆A,2. (115)
To obtain Decoy1(X0, X1) and Decoy1(X0, X0) we first calculate the probability p
(k)(Xj ∧ Xj ⊕ 1|X0) that Bob
obtains the bit j with the X basis given that Alice sends him a pulse of intensity k using the X basis and encoding
the bit value 0. For this, we have that
p(k)(Xj|X0) =
∫ k+
k−
pG(k)
[
1− exp[−ηsyk(1 + (−1)
j cos ξ)
2
](1 − pd)
]
dk. (116)
Then, by using equation (110) we find
p(k)(Xj ∧Xj ⊕ 1|X0) = p(k)(Xj|X0)(1− p(k)(Xj ⊕ 1|X0)) + 1
2
p(k)(X0|X0)p(k)(X1|X0). (117)
Finally, we include the effect of the misalignment in the optical systems. That is, we transform p(k)(Xj ∧Xj ⊕ 1|Xi)
as
P (k)(X0 ∧X1|X0) = p(k)(X0 ∧X1|X0)(1− emis), (118)
P (k)(X1 ∧X0|X0) = p(k)(X0 ∧X1|X0)emis + p(k)(X1 ∧X0|X0). (119)
The number |Xjk| is therefore given by
|Xjk| = Nkp2xP (k)(Xj ∧Xj ⊕ 1|X0). (120)
Next, we calculate Decoy1(Z0, X0) and Decoy1(Z1, X0). For this we need to obtain |ZiXjk|. We have that the
probability p(k)(Xj|Zi) that Bob obtains the bit j with the X basis given that Alice sends him a pulse of intensity k,
prepared in the Z basis, and encoding the bit value i is given by
p(k)(Xj|Z0) =
∫ k+
k−
pG(k)
[
1− exp
(−ηsyk(1 + (−1)j sin ξ/2)
2
)
(1− pd)
]
dk, (121)
p(k)(Xj|Z1) =
∫ k+
k−
pG(k)
[
1− exp
(−ηsyk(1− (−1)j sin 3ξ/2)
2
)
(1− pd)
]
dk. (122)
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In this scenario the probability P (k)(Xj ∧Xj ⊕ 1|Zi) has the form
P (k)(Xj ∧Xj ⊕ 1|Zi) = p(k)(Xj|Zi)(1− p(k)(Xj ⊕ 1|Zi)) + 1
2
p(k)(Xj|Zi)p(k)(Xj ⊕ 1|Zi), (123)
and therefore the quantity |ZiXjk| can be written as
|ZiXjk| = Nk
pxpz
2
P (k)(Xj ∧Xj ⊕ 1|Zi). (124)
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